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Obergefell v. Hodges has changed the legal status of'same-sex mar-
riage in the United States. In some other countries, the legal debate still con-
tinues. In both, legal decisions did not reduce the deep controversies that exist
between groups in society regarding the general character of marriage and
the status ofsame-sex marriage in particular.
This paper discusses the international side effects of the Obergefell deci-
sion, and asks whether these side effects necessarily include social conflict, or
whether there are ways to promote societal agreement on this matter. By ex-
amining the Israeli situation as a test case, the paper argues that while in
the legal realm Obergefell will strengthen the demand for recognition (and
possibly even be decisive in the legal debate), in the social and cultural fields,
gaps will continue to characterize the discourse on this matter. Therefore,
this paper proposes a different socio-legal model, which is relevant to any di-
vided society. Based on H. L. A. Hart's classic positivistic legal theory, this
paper argues that scholarship needs to change the way it (often) understands
the law and its social objects. Instead ofsubstantive expectations from the law
(which lead to a contest over the rights and duties that are included in it),
the law must be treated as an expression of social practices. In this respect, a
pluralist approach to law is possible. Despite deep controversies over right
and wrong, good and bad, society through its legal system should enable dif-
ferent practices within shared social standards.
* Ph.D., M.A. (Hermeneutic Studies); B.A. (History; Talmud); L.L.B. (Law). Senior Lecturer
(Associate Professor), College of Law and Business, Ramat Gan; Research Fellow, The Kogod
Research Center for Contemporary Jewish Thought, Shalom Hartman Institute, Jerusalem;
Visiting Research Fellow (2007-08), Agunah Research Unit, University of Manchester, U.K. I
wish to thank Leon Morris and Noam Zion for our wonderful talks and their very helpful
comments, and Edward Levin for his excellent linguistic editing. The paper was delivered at the
symposium on "The Implications of Obergefell v. Hodges for Families, Faith and the Future," J.
Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, October 12, 2015. I am grateful to
Prof. Lynn Wardle and to the other symposium organizers for the opportunity to participate in
this stimulating event.
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In regards to same-sex relationships, this paper thus proposes that both
contesting sides of the society will acknowledge each side's practical right to
participate in defining the marital abode, possibly including marriage, as
well. This acknowledgement, however, will not derive from a substantive
acceptance of the other's values. The law then will become a tool of tolerance,
a means for reconciliation between different worldviews, without any of
them compromising on its own substantive understanding of fimily, part-
nership, and marriage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Obergefell v. Hodges has changed the legal status of same-sex mar-
riage in the United States. In a post-Obergefell United States, follow-
ing the 5 to 4 Supreme Court decision, same-sex couples are provid-
ed with full and equal rights, including the absolute legal recognition
of same-sex marriage. In some countries, this was achieved by past
legislation; in other countries, the legal debate still continues. In ei-
ther case, legal decisions did not reduce the deep controversies that
exist between groups in society regarding the general character of
marriage and the status of same-sex marriage in particular. Public
discourse on this issue is therefore still precisely characterized as a
"controversial environment."
This opening remark hints at two related discussions that were
raised following the Obergefell v. Hodges case. First, what will be the
international side effects of the Obergefell decision. Second, do the
side effects necessarily include social conflict, or are there ways to
promote societal agreement on this matter? While the first issue fo-
cuses on international perspectives, the second (although derived
from the international perspective) may be relevant to the American
context, as well.
This paper will discuss these two topics, in order to build a con-
ceptual construction for reconciliation between the contesting ap-
proaches regarding same-sex marriage. By discussing the Israeli situa-
tion as a test case, the paper argues that while in the legal realm
Obergefell will strengthen the demand for recognition (and possibly
even be decisive in the legal debate), in social and cultural fields, gaps
will continue to characterize the discourse on this matter. Therefore,
this paper proposes a different socio-legal model, which is relevant to
any divided society. Based on H. L. A. Hart's positivistic legal theo-
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ry,' the paper argues that scholarship needs to change the way it (of-
ten) understands the law and its social objects. Instead of substantive
expectations from the law (which lead to a contest over the rights and
duties that are included in it), the law must be treated as an expres-
sion of social practices. In this respect, a pluralist approach to law is
possible. Despite deep controversies over right and wrong, good and
bad, society through its legal system should enable different practices
within the shared social standards.
In regards to same-sex relationships, the paper thus proposes that
both contesting sides of society will acknowledge each side's practical
right to participate in defining the marital abode, possibly including
marriage, as well. This acknowledgement, however, will not derive
from a substantive acceptance of the other's values. The law then will
become a tool of tolerance, a means for reconciliation between dif-
ferent worldviews, without any of them compromising on its own
substantive understanding of family, partnership, and marriage.
II. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF OBERGEFELL V.
HODGES: EXPECTATIONS
The legal implications of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent ruling
in Obergefell v. Hodges will probably not stop at the borders of the
United States. The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in past value-
based conflicts have been widely cited and discussed, and have affect-
ed both academic discourse and judicial rulings all over the world.' It
would not be too far-reaching to assume that the impact of Obergefell
will be similar. The decision might bolster the struggle of same-sex
couples for legal recognition in other countries and cultures. Follow-
ing the decision, it is reasonable to expect that it will reinforce the
demand for legal recognition of same-sex partnerships, and thus pro-
1. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEFr OF LAW (1961) (specific references will be pro-
vided below).
2. One famous example is the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, as stated by jus-
tice J. Breyer, "And it was Brown, after all ... that affected so deeply not only Americans but the
world." Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 842 (2007). (1
learned of this statement from the following interesting source: Erin Miller, The Global Impact of
Brown v. Board of Education, SCOTUS Blog (Feb. 18, 2010, 12:42 PM), http://www. scotus-
blog.com/2010/02/the-global-impact-of-brown-v-board-of-education/). More generally, direct
influence between American constitutional law and Israeli constitutional law is documented. See
Iddo Porat, The Use of Foreign Law in Israeli Constitutional Adjudication, in ISRmELI CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW IN TIHEMAKING 151 (Gideon Sapir et al. eds., 2013), especially at 154-55 (citing
Suzie Navot's research).
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vide same-sex couples with full and equal rights in a growing number
of countries. In fact, the trend (generally speaking) is already towards
full recognition and equality of same-sex couples, so the Obergefell
case will soon become a natural element in any discussion or debate
of same-sex marriage.
From social, cultural, and religious perspectives, in many coun-
tries including the United States, the rights of same-sex couples, and
especially the right to marry, are extremely controversial. Conserva-
tive social forces, often led by religious groups, hesitate to change
(and often even vigorously oppose any change in) what traditionally
was understood and believed to be marriage. The majority of the
U.S. Supreme Court took a clear position in Obergefell (although the
debate has not yet ended).' In some countries legislators, rather than
the courts, took a similar position.' However, in other countries the
legal process is still in earlier stages.' Typically, the status of same-sex
couples is built in a step-by-step process, including both judicial deci-
sions and legislation, starting from specific rights, leading to full
recognition. In this process, as argued above, it would not be surpris-
ing to find the new U.S. Supreme Court's ruling as a supportive ar-
gument in favor of full recognition of same-sex marriage.
How will this occur? As a test case, I will examine the status of
3. Recent developments in the European Court of Human Rights have indeed referred
to the Obergefell case. In Oliari and Others v. Italy, the court established "the positive obligation
of the State to ensure recognition of a legal framework for same-sex couples in absence of mar-
riage," but did not (yet?) recognize a positive right to same-sex marriage. See Giuseppe Zago, A
Victory for Italian Same-Sex Couples, A Victory for European Homosexuals? A Commentary on Oliari
v. Italy, Articolo 29 (Aug. 21, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2689060.
4. One aspect that, in my opinion, will lead to a collision and will require the attention
of the United States Supreme Court is the extent to which religious groups, institutions, and
individuals that object to same-sex marriage are obliged to accept and recognize it. The current
tendency is to compel those groups to recognize same-sex marriage, and Chief Justice Roberts,
in his dissenting opinion, was very concerned by this issue. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584, 2625-26 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting). In the Hobby Lobby case, on the other hand, the
U.S. Supreme Court supported exceptions for some corporations based on religious beliefs. It
seems, thus, that the conflict is inevitable. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751, 2759 (2014).
5. See Brief for 54 International and Comparative Law Experts from 27 Countries and
the Marriage and Family Law Research Project as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent,
Obergefellv. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571 & 14-574), available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ObergefellHodges/AmicusBriefs/14-556 54_International
and-ComparativeLawExperts from27_Countries.pdf.
6. See id. European countries differ in the measure of recognition that is given to same-
sex couples, including the option of marriage. The European Court of Human Rights, however,
ruled that there is an obligation to establish a legal framework for same-sex couples. See supra
note 3.
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same-sex couples in Israel and the possible influence of Obergefell.
The present status of same-sex couples in Israel is discussed in several
papers.' I will therefore focus on the future, on expected and pro-
posed developments in this area.
III. THE ISRAELI CASE
Israel is a paradigmatic example of a society divided in its attitude
towards same-sex relationships. It is a society in which the civil legal
system recognizes (in principle) equal rights of same-sex couples, and
tries to implement these rights in practice to the greatest extent pos-
sible.' But, a strong religious establishment objects to such rights.' It
is also a society in which same-sex relationships are part of the nor-
mal life of some social groups, while still others (more traditional or
conservative; not necessarily "religious" in the classic meaning) reject
7. See, e.g., Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Same-Sex Relationships and Israeli Law, in SAME-SEX
COUPLES-COMPARATIVE INSIGl-ITS ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 131 (ed. Macarena
Saez, 2015). Additionally, Itshak Cohen's paper The Development of the Issue of Same-Sex Couples
Under Israeli Law appears in this issue of the BYU Journal of Public Law following participation
in the Symposium on "The Implications of Obergefell v. Hodges for Families, Faith and the Fu-
ture,"J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, October 12, 2015.
8. In Israel, marriage and divorce are performed according to religious law in the reli-
gious courts. See Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953 (Isr.).
Civil marriages performed abroad are recognized (see HCJ 2232/03 Plonit v. The Regional
Rabbinical Court Tel Aviv 61(3) PD 496 [2006] (Isr.)). The Israeli Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the right of same-sex couples who performed marriage abroad to be registered as mar-
ried, but did not (yet?) provide those couples with full recognition (HCJ 3045/05 Ben-Ari v.
The Director of the Population Administration in the Ministry of the Interior 61(3) PD 537
[2006] (Isr.)). Marriage registration, however, is a de-facto recognition, which includes also the
right to divorce. Some spousal financial rights were recognized even earlier, in the Danilovich
case (HCJ 721/94 El Al Israeli Airlines v. Danilovich 48(5) PD 749 [1994] (Isr.)). In that case,
the Supreme Court obligated El Al, the Israeli national airline, to provide its employee's same-
sex spouse with benefits to which opposite sex spouses are entitled. That landmark decision
acknowledged same-sex couples as cohabitants, opening the gate for providing them with the
relatively wide range of rights that are given to cohabitants according to Israeli law.
9. It goes without saying that rabbinical courts would not recognize any kind of same-
sex marriage (and any rights derived from it). Rabbinical courts do recognize some aspects of
civil, nonreligious marriage and define such unions as Noahide marriage. See Avishalom
Westreich, Rhetoric and Substance 'Came Down Wrapped Together'? On Civil Maniage in Israel
Following the Noahide Decision, 543 FAM. IN L. REv. 6-7 (2013-2014) (Heb.)). However, Noa-
hide marriage would not apply to same-sex marriage, although more and more countries recog-
nize it as marriage, and, in principle, same-sex marriage, too, could be defined as Noahide mar-
riage. This was interestingly illustrated when a homosexual couple, Uzi Even and Amit Kama,
filed a divorce suit in a rabbinical court (probably as a protest). The rabbinical court has ig-
nored the file. See Amir Paz-Fuchs, The Ironies of Gay Divorce in Israel, OXFORD HUMAN
RIGI-irs Hun (Dec. 20, 2012), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/ the-ironies-of-gay-divorce-in-israell.
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them."' It is a society in which the political system tries (without total
success) to satisfy everyone and to provide same-sex couples with civil
rights, but without fully recognizing their relationships as equal."
Alongside these controversies, the direction in the Israeli legal
system is quite clear. Similar to other countries, the Israeli legal sys-
tem is moving towards enhancing the rights of same-sex couples in-
cluding, as I have mentioned above, a de facto right to marry and di-
vorce." In this environment, it is reasonable to expect that the
Obergefell v. Hodges case will soon become part of the agenda of the
supportive opinions, and we will probably see it as an additional ar-
gument (or even evidence) in favor of fidl and firmal recognition of
same-sex marriage. I assume that this recognition will be in both the
legal and the public spheres.
In the margin of my discussion, before entering the legal arena, I
would like to make a few short arguments regarding the public
sphere." Significant sectors of Israeli society (which are often seen as
the hegemonic groups in Israel, and are-at least are viewed as be-
ing-strongly represented in Israeli media)' 4 have adopted Western
liberal culture, with a particular orientation to American liberalism."
Liberal groups in Israel, too, follow the recent trend towards full
recognition of same-sex relationships. This trend is expressed in a
growing social legitimacy for establishing same-sex marital abodes
and viewing them as a manifestation of basic liberal values and human
10. These cultural differences are highlighted in the reactions to the Gay Pride Parades
in Jerusalem as compared to those held in Tel Aviv. While in Tel Aviv tens of thousands partic-
ipate in the parade and it becomes a municipal event, supported by the city council, in Jerusa-
lem the parade faces strong objections. In 2015, one of those present was murdered by a radical
ultra-Orthodox man. See Yonah Jeremy Bob, Gay Pride Parade Stabber Charged with Murder,
JERUSALEM PosT (Aug. 24, 2015, 9:13 AM), http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/State-indicts-
alleged-gay-pride-parade-stabber-Schlissel-for-murder-413072.
11. For example, the attempt to provide same-sex couples with tax benefits. While the
government did not succeed in passing a law in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) due to in-
ternal disputes, they were finally instituted by a memo of the Tax Authority. See Moran Azulay,
Tax Authority Grants Same-Sex Couples Equal Tax Benefits, Ynet (Dec. 30, 2013, 10:17 PM),
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4471395,00.html.
12. See Blecher-Prigat and Cohen, supra note 7.
13. I will limit myself to some basic statements. Further and deeper discussion obviously
requires more serious sociological research, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
14. As an anecdote in regards to our topic: Yitzhak ben Horin, a reporter for Ynet, the
most popular Israeli news and content website, defined the dissenting opinions in Obergefell as
"opinions ... relatively dark to the 21" century." Yitzhak ben Horin, U.S. History: Same-Sex
Marriage Legal, Ynet (June 26, 2015, 5:15 PM), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-
46731 10,00.html, (Hebrew).
15. See MENACI IEM MAUTNER, LAW ANDT TIE CULTURE OF ISRAEL. (2011).
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rights (such as freedom and equality),'6 but without the necessary
deep discussion on the character of the family in the society that may
be affected by these changes. My expectation is that the legitimacy of
same-sex marriage (together with other aspects of family life, includ-
ing procreation) will soon become an axiom in public discourse. This
process will reinforce the demand for providing same-sex couples
with full social and legal rights, even those that are not yet afforded
them. Its consequences will be particularly in the legal field, to which
I now turn.
As for the consequences of Obergefell in the legal sphere, the con-
stitutional rulings of the Israeli Supreme Court are traditionally in-
fluenced by foreign jurisdictions, which are frequently cited by its
justices." It will take some time, but in the end, Obergefell v. Hodges
will also enter the Israeli legal discussion. Indeed, the Israeli Supreme
Court today is less activist than it was two decades ago, under Chief
Justice Aharon Barak. However, yet it does not refrain from making
significant decisions, including judicial legislation, when it deems it
necessary." Lower courts are subject to the Supreme Court's rulings,
but even without a formal decision, the "spirit" of the Supreme Court
spreads and is reflected in lower court decisions that often drive sig-
nificant change. Thus, in recent years, lower courts have also made
changes-some of which have been revolutionary-by participating
in a bottom-up process. This is especially true regarding family mat-
16. I am not arguing that liberal values necessarily lead to accepting same-sex marriage.
Rather, I maintain that certain social and academic groups see it in this way. The very issue of
what should be the liberal position towards same-sex marriage is disputed, although (as argued
above) the trend today is towards viewing this as a basic right. See, e.g., Greg Walker, Public
Reason Liberalism and Sex Neutral Marriage: A Response to Francis J. Beckwith, 28 RAT. JUR. 486
(2015).
17. See Porat, supra note 2. In a recent example, the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the
High Court of Justice, discussed the legitimacy of limiting the right to free speech in an Israeli
anti-boycott law that defines support of the boycotting of Israel or Israeli institutions as a cause
for tort suit and imposes some governmental sanctions on those who support boycotting (the
Law for Prevention of Damage to the State of Israel through Boycott - 2011). The Court re-
jected the suit, basing itself, inter alia, on American precedents that discussed the limitations on
free speech in the context of boycotts (for example, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886 (1982)). See HCJ 5239/11 The Supreme Court of Israel, Uri Avnery et. al. v. the
Knesset (Apr., 15, 2015), Versa Legal Database (Isr.) available at http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/
opinions/avneri-v-knesset.
18. See, e.g., in 2009 the High Court of Justice struck down a law that established a pri-
vate court system, viewing it as unconstitutional. See HCJ 2605/05 The Supreme Court of Isra-
el, Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance (Nov. 19, 2009), Versa Legal
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ters in general, and same-sex couples in particular." Hence, even
without an explicit Supreme Court decision fully and formally recog-
nizing same-sex marriages performed abroad (rather than recognition
for the purpose of registration),o and certainly without formal legis-
lation, family courts have already acknowledged the rights of same-
sex couples to marry and divorce. Divorce of same-sex couples is thus
not unknown in Israeli courts, even though the country does not
formally recognize any kind of civil marriage, and certainly not same-
sex marriage." It is a reasonable expectation therefore, that we will
see references to the Obergefell case in Israeli family courts very soon.
Other groups in Israel, however, live in a completely different
sphere. Religious tribunals-which in Israel have authority over mar-
riage and divorce matters 22-do not, and will not accept same-sex
marriage. Both rabbinical courts, which adhere to the Orthodox Jew-
ish view, and tribunals of other religions, which take a similar con-
servative approach in family matters, entirely oppose same-sex rela-
tionships because of their religious views. While they may accept
same-sex relationships as a social fact, and sometimes even reveal
some tolerance for this different lifestyle,23 marriage is not an op-
19. See, e.g., family courts have accepted suits for tort compensation that is imposed on a
recalcitrant spouse who refuses to grant his or her spouse divorce (get refusal). See, e.g., Ayelet
Blecher-Prigat & Benjamin Shmueli, The Inteiplay Between Tot Law and Religious Family Law:
The Israeli Case, 26 ARIZ.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 279, 284-87 (2009). This is a common decision
by family courts, and was approved recently by the Tel Aviv District Court, but has not yet
reached the Supreme Court. Family courts' active contribution to the formation of law is not
limited to general family law matters, it relates to same-sex rights in particular. For example,
during 2013-2015 a few divorce cases of same sex couples (who married abroad) were discussed
in family courts, even though same sex marriages are not formally recognized. For this phe-
nomenon and its limitations see Daphna Hacker, What Has Changed This Year? Families' Law -
Between the Chaotic and the Harmonious, 9 Din Udvarim 295, 312- 313 (2015) (Heb.).
20. See supra note 8.
2 1. This was the result in the Even and Kama case. See Paz-Fuchs, supra note 9. Since
then a few more divorces have been issued by family courts. See Hacker, supra note 19.
22. Religious tribunals have sole authority over marriage and divorce, which should be
performed according to religious law (Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Marriage and Divorce
Law, 5713-1953 (Isr.)). Religious tribunals have shared authority over matters related to di-
vorce, such as maintenance and property division (id., art. 3), some of which adjudicate accord-
ing to civil law (property distribution), while others follow religious law (maintenance). See HCJ
1000/92 Bavli v. The High Rabbinical Court 48(2) PD 221 [1994] (Isr.).
23. Rabbinical courts rarely discuss same-sex marriage. I have found one verdict that
discusses the custody of children whose mother lived in same-sex relationships. The decision
confirmed the mother's custodial rights, which it deemed to be in the best interest of the chil-
dren. In my opinion, the decision represents some degree of tolerance for the lifestyle of the
mother (with some differences between the rabbinical judges, as a close reading of the verdict
reveals). See File No. 922153/4 Rabbinical Court (Haifa), Plony v. Plonit, (August 23, 2015),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
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tion.2 4 Their view is not without support. In the public sphere, more
traditional or conservative approaches struggle and will continue
their struggle (however, following the above discussion on the legal
developments, might be a rearguard battle) to delegitimize same-sex
relationships and to maintain their monopoly of heterosexual mar-
riage.
The combination of two legal authorities, different worldviews,
and past legal decisions (which tried to develop civil aspects of Israeli
family law, including homosexual rights) leads to a somewhat bizarre
situation. Today, civil marriages that were conducted abroad are rec-
ognized by Israeli civil law, but their dissolution is done in rabbinical
courts.2 Same-sex marriages are recognized only for the purpose of
registration but in practice are treated as marriage and are dissolved
in civil family courts. Thus, same-sex marriages have a great ad-
vantage over opposite-sex marriages from a civil perspective (that is,
dissolution in a civil court). Thus, from a civil perspective, it may
even be said that same-sex marriages are more established as part of
Israeli civil family law than opposite-sex marriage. This situation
surely does not make any sense. My expectations are that the Oberge-
fell case will strengthen the demand of same-sex couples for full
recognition and will influence Israeli family law, but will not improve
this situation.
A revision of the current legal framework regarding marriage and
divorce is therefore needed, as many writers have argued in the past. 26
And in this revision, the status of same-sex marriage will play a signif-
icant role. I would even say that the key for the success of this kind of
revision is bridging the gap between the contested views in Israeli so-
ciety regarding same-sex partnership. Is this possible?
24. See Paz-Fuchs, supra note 9.
25. This situation is a compromise between the civil and the Jewish religious systems.
Some Jewish law decision-makers view civil marriage as valid from the point of view of religious
law, and it therefore needs to be dissolved in a religious court with a religious writ of divorce (a
get). Civil marriages are recognized, but in order to prevent cases in which divorced couples
would be considered married by a rabbinical court, the Israeli High Court of Justice decided in
2006 that its dissolution would be performed in rabbinical courts. See the HCJ 2232/03 Plonit
v. Regional Rabbinical Court (Tel Aviv) 61(3) PD 496 [2006] (Isr.).
26. For a survey of the proposals, see AVISHALOM WESTREICH & PINHAS SI- FMAN, A
CivIL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN ISRAEL. 72-85 (Ruth Gavison,
ed., Kfir Levy, trans., 2013).
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IV. BRIDGING THE GAP? OBERGEFELL AND THE FUTURE
CHARACTER [S] OF CIVIL MARRIAGE IN ISRAEL
The solution to this paradoxical situation is to change the Israeli
framework of marriage and divorce. When this change occurs, the
legal system will have to consider the status of same-sex marriage. In
a post-Obergefell world, the demand for full recognition of same-sex
marriage will surely be high and unyielding. Yet, the success of the
demand (whether full or partial) depends in a greater extent on the
characteristics of the new legal system. The following discussion will
attempt to explore this argument, focusing on proposed models of
the Israeli marriage and divorce system. The relevancy of this discus-
sion is, however, much wider than the specific Israeli context, since
the legal structures that will be discussed characterize other legal sys-
tems, and my proposed construction for reconciliation (infra) can be
relevant to many other divided societies.
In the last three decades or so, there have been repeated calls for
a change in the marriage and divorce system in Israel.27 Their focus is
mainly on the application of the basic right to marriage and divorce
(which, in Israel, is limited due to the monopoly of the religious es-
tablishment on marriage and divorce). However, the discussion on
this issue-what should be the proper marriage and divorce arrange-
ment-has implications for same-sex marriage as well.
Proposals for restricting or terminating the religious monopoly
on marriage and divorce in Israel have long been an integral, contin-
uous part of the public agenda in Israel. Such proposals are divided
into two main categories." One proposal is the retention of the reli-
gious route, but adds a civil alternative to it. Those who support this
two-route system propose to establish two accessible alternatives: civ-
il marriage and religious marriage. By this, it is argued, Israel-as a
Jewish and democratic state-will preserve the unique status of reli-
gious marriage (and Jewish marriage in particular), without harming
the basic human right to marry and divorce (which, by their nature,
religious marriages do). Accordingly, some of those who support the
two routes solution propose to define the civil alternative as civil un-
ion rather than marriage, thus bypassing the difficulty in using a
symbolic term (marriage) for what previously was viewed solely as a
27. See Id.
28. See Id. at 73-78.
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religious institution.29
Another proposal is for the formation of a uniform civil legal
framework for marriage and divorce in Israel, while recognizing the
validity of a variety of ceremonies. According to such proposals, the
various cultural and religious groups and their traditions would be
fully represented through their respective ceremonies, and yet, all
marriages and divorces would be covered by the same civil umbrella.
To the American reader this proposal sounds familiar: American fam-
ily law is civil in its nature while giving room to religious, cultural, or
other kinds of ceremonies in the creation of marriage. The civil
framework proposal is indeed similar, although some features of the
proposed civil framework will be different, retaining the unique char-
acter of Israel as a Jewish state. Thus, for example, religious courts
will continue to have some authority, both on civil legal issues (under
the civil umbrella) and on religious issues (such as the authority to
prevent divorce refusal on religious grounds). In addition, there may
still be some restrictions on civil divorce when it is unaccompanied by
religious divorce, in order to prevent an acute collision between the
two worlds (religious and civil)."
In 2013, Professor Pinhas Shifman and I discussed these two op-
tions. We argued in favor of the second option, with regard to both
civil and religious considerations. We did not make a decisive argu-
ment on the status of same-sex marriage in both options, leaving this
question to further discussion.31 In this respect, due to the expected
cross-border influence of Obergefell v. Hodges, and in particular its ef-
fect on the Israeli legal system,32 the time has arrived to make more
decisive claims regarding the future status of same-sex marriage in Is-
raeli family law.
In the current legal atmosphere, same-sex marriage receives in-
creasing recognition, but only by judicial decisions, and not by legis-
lation (like other elements of Israeli civil family law). If, or when, one
29. See id.
30. According to Jewish law, when a (religiously) married wife gives birth, with the fa-
ther other than her husband, the child is considered a manzer (a bastard), and he or she cannot
marry another Jewish spouse. In order to prevent this severe religious result, some argue (and I
share their view) that even in a civil legal framework, when a couple was married in a religious
ceremony and divorced only civilly, divorce will not include the right to remarry until religious
divorce is granted. In this case, religious courts might have the authority to impose sanctions on
the recalcitrant spouse. See WESTREICH & SHIFMAN, supra note 26, at 91-94.
31. Id.at90-91.
32. See "III. THE ISRAELI CASE," s-upra Part III,
313
3 031
of the above two options of civil arrangements of marriage and di-
vorce is accepted, I have no doubt that same-sex marriage will be in-
cluded. But how?
The first option, the two-route system, will create two different
alternatives for marriage and divorce-religious vs. civil. According
to this proposal, the current religious monopoly would be replaced
by a system that enables the couple to decide which route, religious
or civil, they wish to choose for themselves, and their choice would
continue to accompany them throughout their married life. This
proposal creates a sharp dichotomy between the civil and religious
routes. The two will compete for the heart of the Israeli public, each
trying to expand the numbers of its supporters and followers, or to
raise the number of couples who will choose it as their marriage and
divorce route. Unfortunately, in my opinion, competitive routes will
result in deepening the gap between them, as each will try to empha-
size its marriage and divorce system's uniqueness. Thus, sooner or
later, the civil system will adopt an ultraliberal worldview in various
aspects of marriage and divorce, while any call for restricting it will
be denied and given the negative tag of belonging to the religious
route. I assume, for instance, that the civil route, being emptied of its
religious restrictions, will adopt a divorce on demand system, without
any limitation on divorce." The religious route will do the same, but
move towards the other extreme. I assume that it will move to the
more radical conservative approach in all conflictual matters. On the
right to divorce issue, for example, it will adopt an ultraconservative
view that opposes unilateral divorce even in cases of irretrievable
breakdown between the spouses, when the marriage has actually end-
ed.34
A similar result can be expected in regards to same-sex marriage.
Defining the civil route as an absolute alternative to the religious
route and even labeling it as the opposite of the religious route will
influence its attitude towards same-sex marriage. The civil route will
adhere to the view that best expresses its values. Thus, since in to-
day's liberal discourse recognizing same-sex marriage is considered to
33. For the various approaches and the tendency towards no-fault divorce systems, see
Lynn D. Wardle, International Maniage and Divorce Regulation and Recognition: A Survey, 29
FAM. L.Q. 497, (1995). See also Shahar Lifshitz, The Liberal Transformation of Spousal Law: Past,
Present and Future, 13 THFORETICALINQ. L. 15 (2012).
34. We find both positions in Jewish law. See generally, Avishalom Westreich, The Right
to Divorce in Jewish Law: Between Politics and Ideology, I INT'L J. OF TI HE JURISPRUDENCE OF
THEIFAM. 177, 194-95 (2010).
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be the true and justified expression of the equal right to marriage and
divorce, it will surely be fully acknowledged by this civil route. The
fact that Obergefell made the recognition of same-sex marriage obliga-
tory in all American states will anchor it even more firmly within the
consensus, and will lead to its introduction in this Israeli civil route
without any debate. The religious route, on the other hand, will con-
tinue to completely ignore and totally reject such marriages. There
will be no recognition of same-sex marriage, and probably (as long as
this will be under its judicial authority) no recognition of any rights
of same-sex couples, whether married or not.
In my opinion, however, the sharp dichotomy between the reli-
gious and the civil routes, which will probably become deeper and
deeper, is a great disadvantage of the two-route proposal, and a dan-
ger to Israeli society. In such a divided society (some might say, more
positively, a multicultural society; see below), splitting marriage and
divorce into two routes can act as a catalyst for widening the gap be-
tween societal groups. It might result in a de facto separation be-
tween these groups, while reducing, or even eliminating, the shared
values and common denominators of Israeli society. Israel is an im-
migrant state, with populations from various background, cultures,
and origins (from India in the east to America in the west, Sweden in
the north to Ethiopia in the south), which has been attempting since
the late nineteenth century (before the formal establishment of the
state in 1948) to turn this mixture of cultures into a single society,
and later, into a single state. Although in recent years the call for
multiculturalism in Israel has grown stronger, there is still a basic
need to preserve shared communal values. Some will see this as an
important step in facing national conflicts that Israel is part of. Oth-
ers will see unity as a value by itself. In any event, preventing this
kind of social division is still important in this relatively young state.
In this environment, formal legal separation between groups might
result in deepening existing gaps instead of bridging them, and thus
will be very harmful to the stability of Israeli society."
Accordingly, establishing two routes, will lead the civil route to
follow the current wide recognition of same-sex marriage, while cre-
ating a high level of conflict between the two routes on this issue.
The civil recognition of same-sex marriage will be stronger in the
post-Obergefell world, in Israel as well as in other Western societies,
35. For additional critics of this route, see WESTREICH & SHIFMAN, supra note 26, at
75-78.
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which have civil marriage and divorce law. However, it will not assist
in bridging the gaps between different worldviews in each one of
those cultures and societies.
At this point, I will turn to the second proposal for the Israeli
marriage and divorce system: the common civil framework. After in-
troducing this proposal, I will examine its expected attitude towards
same-sex marriage, and propose a conceptual framework that may
enable general acceptance of that attitude. As mentioned earlier, the
proposed framework may have global application. Its relevancy is
wider than the Israeli context, and it can play a role in other civil le-
gal systems of divided societies, as well.
The common civil framework draws a completely different pic-
ture than the two-route system. Such a civil framework model would
deal with all matters of marriage and divorce in Israel (that is, finan-
cial aspects, child and spouse maintenance, grounds for divorce, etc.)
according to one civil law. Religious and cultural differences will find
their explicit expression in the creation and dissolution of marriage.
The civil legal framework will grant full legitimacy to a wide variety
of religious and nonreligious marriage ceremonies, as well as a variety
of divorce ceremonies and procedures.
This kind of framework is civil in its nature. Nevertheless, when
constructing and designing its substance, the legal system should take
into consideration the multicultural nature of the society, the variety
of beliefs and traditions, and the different understandings of family
and family values. It will therefore have to give some place for expres-
sion of the more traditional approaches (both Jewish and non-
Jewish), making an effort to mediate as much as possible between
these approaches and the civil-liberal nature of the legal system. This
is surprisingly feasible, at least in the Israeli context. In many core is-
sues of family law, there are voices within Jewish religious law that
reflect approaches that adhere to modern liberal values, or at least
find legal and hermeneutical ways to cooperate with the civil law that
is derived from these values (other religions require further research).
This is true in regards to the laws of marriage and divorce, 6 inher-
itance law," financial matters (equal distribution of property)," and
36. See Westreich, supra note 9.
37. See Daphna Hacker, Religious Tribunals in Democratic States: Lessons from the Israeli
Rabbinical Courts, 27 J.L. & RELIGION 59 (2011-12).
38. See Shlomo Dichovsky, The Presumption of Sharing - Is It the Law of the Kingdom, 18
TcilUMIN 31 (1998) (Heb.).
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the basic principles of custody cases.39 Gaps do exist, tensions do
arise, and political conflicts break out from time to time." But the
heart of the law can be based, and in many aspects is already based,
on a shared language. Thus, the common civil legal framework can
express a wide range of worldviews, not only by accepting various
ceremonies in order to perform marriage and divorce, but also in its
substantive law.
Let us examine in greater detail one of the above examples-the
grounds for divorce. At present, no-fault divorce is a widely accepted
divorce regime. No-fault divorce, however, is not a single approach,
but rather consists of a wide range of options. Among no-fault di-
vorce possibilities we can find a moderate one, which does not sup-
port divorce in every case, but only when there is an irretrievable
breakdown of marriage.4 ' From a religious aspect, in Jewish law, alt-
hough fault divorce or divorce by mutual agreement are most com-
mon, we can find sufficient basis for moderate no-fault divorce ap-
proaches, as well, and these approaches are used in practice in quite a
few rabbinical courts. 42 Thus, a civil legal framework, which adopts a
no-fault divorce regime, but restricts itself to cases of an irretrievable
breakdown of marriage, can be accepted by Jewish religious courts, as
well. Rabbinical courts will require a religious divorce ceremony in
order to acknowledge the divorce, but there will be no substantive
conflict regarding the core rationale and the application of the di-
vorce law.
Same-sex marriage is different. The Israeli rabbinical court sys-
tem is dominated by the Jewish Orthodox view (sometimes even by
its strict ultra-Orthodox branches), which vigorously object to same-
sex relationships. Although there are voices within Orthodox Jewry
that, to different degrees, do support recognizing same-sex relation-
39. The best interest of the child is the common principle shared by civil and religious
courts (both Jewish and non-Jewish). See, e.g., the decision of the Rabbinical District Court of
Haifa, supra, note 23. The recent shift toward children's rights is not yet reflected in the reli-
gious courts, but, in my opinion, there is no reason not to adopt a moderate version of a chil-
dren's rights doctrine.
40. See Amihai Radzyner, Problematic Halakbic 'Creativity' in Israeli Rabbinical Court Rul-
ings, 20 JEwisti L. ANN. 103 (2013).
41. See Shahar Lifshitz, I Want to Get Divorced Now! On the Civil Regulation of Divorce, 28
TEL-Aviv U. L. REv. 671 (2005) (Heb.).
42. See Westreich, supra note. As in civil law, Jewish law does not provide a strict defini-
tion of irretrievable breakdown. Thus, it is possible to define irretrievable breakdown after
twelve months of divorce proceedings (Rabbenu Jeroham) or after eighteen months of conflict
between the spouses (Rabbi Hayyim Palache).
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ships, these voices are still rare, and even among them, I doubt if
marriage is included. Some of those relatively new approaches try, for
example, to reinterpret the biblical prohibition on same-sex relation-
ships as excluding current same-sex relationships, which are based on
sincere partnership," but this is a marginal view within Orthodoxy.
Even according to the more open approaches, it is still very hard,
even impossible, to take their view a step further and to expand their
recognition to defining marriage, from a religious point of view, as
including same-sex couples. And even if we do find this kind of ap-
proach, basically, as stated, same-sex relationships are rejected by the
mainstream of Jewish Orthodoxy and deemed as severely prohibited
according to formal Jewish law.
Same-sex marriage is therefore one of the greatest challenges (if
not the greatest) to the civil legal system, if it indeed wishes to give
expression to the worldviews of wider parts of society. In my opinion,
it is not a question whether it can do it or not, but a task: the civil le-
gal framework has to find ways to bridge the gap, separating all ele-
ments of the society. It cannot base itself solely on one worldview; it
must rather also consider the feelings and beliefs of other (more tra-
ditional and religious) groups. In many countries, it is the present
task. In Israel, it is a future challenge, if (or when) a civil legal frame-
work will be adopted. In this respect, I expect an intensive discussion
regarding the status of same-sex marriage: is it legitimate to include it
in a uniform civil framework?
The gap seems unbridgeable. In the current legal atmosphere,
especially after the Obergefell v. Hodges decision, the demand for full
recognition to same-sex marriage is very strong, and it will be diffi-
cult to establish any new civil framework without including same-sex
marriage. This will raise a great challenge in Israel, as well as in simi-
larly divided societies. Will these legal reforms necessarily exacerbate
intrasocietal, cultural, religious, and political strife? Is it possible to
enhance reconciliation between the conflicting sectors of such a soci-
ety, while advancing the rights of same-sex couples? In my opinion,
the answer is yes, but one must choose the appropriate strategy to do
so. The following theoretical framework intends to propose such a
43. See STEVEN GREENBERG, WRESTLING Wri GOD AND MEN: HOMOSEXUALITY
IN TIEJEWISI ITRADIrION, (1st ed. 2005).
44. Id.; See DORON M. KAIR, Same-Sex Maniage and Jewish Law-Time for a New Para-





V. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MARRIAGE AS SUBSTANCE
AND MARRIAGE AS A SOCIAL PRACTICE: THE KEY TO SOCIETAL
AGREEMENT
I mentioned above several aspects in which, despite the apparent
differences between civil law and religious law, it is possible to find
common ground. In those aspects, the civil and religious legal sys-
tems can, and do, find common denominators upon which they
agree, and thus civil law can create a law that is basically accepted (or
at least tolerated) by both.
Nevertheless, same-sex marriage, as I have argued above, is dif-
ferent. Thus, as opposed to the other family matters, such as divorce
and property matters, same-sex marriage will continue to be substan-
tively contested, and it will not be possible to attain mutual recogni-
tion of shared values on this matter. If we wish to create a legal and
societal framework in which some acceptance will be reached, it will
have to be done in a different way, by a new theoretical construction.
In what follows I would like to propose such a theoretical framework.
My main argument will be based on the concept of "law as social
practice," which, in my opinion, can be the means for bridging the
gap between different parts of such a divided society. How is this to
be done?
The two worldviews differ profoundly. They reflect contradicto-
ry understandings of basic rights and values (e.g., equality, the right
to marry, and the very concept of family), and mediating between
them on the basis of common values is difficult, and almost impossi-
ble. The solution thus needs to be found in a different direction. Us-
ing H. L. A. Hart's classic model of legal positivism, I suggest that a
more modest expectation from the legal system of a divided society
may assist in solving the problem.
Common legal discourse is substantive by its nature. It is based
on questions of morality, and deals intensively with rights and values.
From a legal theory perspective, it is a classic non-positivist dis-
course, and sometimes is even based on natural law arguments. 4s The
same obviously holds true for our issue, which deals with basic rights
such as equality and individual autonomy. This kind of a discourse
45. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOuSLY 22-31 (1978).
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cannot reach an agreement between these two contesting approaches,
and it indeed leads to a dead end.
The positivist discourse, on the other hand, is more modest. Its
definitions of law derive from society rather than from substance. But
whereas classic positivism focuses on external aspects of the law, that
is, the coercive power of the society and its obedience by the peo-
ple,' Hart focuses on the internal aspects of the law, that is, its basis
consists of its acceptance by the society." Here precisely lies the solu-
tion to our conflict.
According to Hart's legal positivism, the legal system is based on
social rules, which treat certain types of behavior as social standards.
These shared social standards are based on their mutual acceptance
by society and on the mutual understanding of their importance to
the life of society,48 but not necessarily with common substantive
recognition of them as absolute rights and values. As Hart writes, "it
is not even true that those who do accept the system voluntarily must
conceive of themselves as morally bound to do so." 4 9
This structure enables a pluralism of worldviews, beliefs, and
perhaps even moralities, as long as there is an agreement on the
common social practices, which are reflected in the law of the socie-
ty." The challenge here is, therefore, less the substance than the
practice: can we build our society on shared practices which preserve
the agreed interests, while still respecting each other's beliefs?" I am
46. See JosEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION To
THE TI IEORY OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 5-26 (2nd ed. 1980).
47. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 79-88 (1961) (discussing the distinction
between internal and external point of views). On the difference between Hart and Joseph Raz
regarding the role of society as the basis for legal obligation, see Timothy A.O. Endicott, Inter-
pretation, furisdiction, and the Authority of Law, 6 A.P.A. NEwstErfER 14 note 16 (2007), Ox-
ford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 22/2007, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=9895 51.
48. See HART, supra note 47, at 79-88. For a recent critical discussion on the im-
portance of agreement to legal positivism, see Andrew Tutt, Legal Agreement, 48 AKRON L.
REv. 215 (2015).
49. HART, supra note 47, at 198 (emphasis added).
50. On the connection between Hart's theory and legal pluralism, see also MARIANO
CROCE, A Practice Theory of Legal Pluralism: Hart's (Inadvertent) Defence of the Indistinctiveness of
Law 27 CAN.J.L. & JURIS. 27 (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2433153.
51. A similar argument, with broad implications, which is based on a constitutional dis-
cussion, is made by John D. Inazu in his forthcoming book: CONFIDEINT PLURALISM:
SURVIVING AN) THRIVING TilROUGH DEEP DIFFERENCE (forthcoming, 2016), who argues,
"The goal of Confident Pluralism is not to settle which views are right and which views are
wrong. Rather, it proposes that the future of our democratic experiment requires finding a way
to be steadfast in our personal convictions, while also making room for the cacophony that may
ensue when others disagree with us. Confident Pluralism allows us to function-and even to
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aware that it is not always easy to make the distinction between sub-
stance and social practice and to apply it in reality, but it is, in my
opinion, a very promising framework. Success in making such a dis-
tinction can lead to a practical reconciliation between the very deep
differences in society, without any group being required to forgo its
values and beliefs.
How can this framework work with same-sex marriage? Marital
abode is a social practice. It is shared by various groups in society de-
spite differences in its content and in the ideology on which it is
based. As a social practice it includes most, if not all, aspects of mari-
tal life: the creation of partnership between two spouses, making
them a couple, the option to dissolve the partnership and become
separated again, reproduction, continuous cooperation in raising the
children, educating and socializing them, financial relationships be-
tween the spouses and between them and others, and so on. As a so-
cial practice, it is shared and recognized by society's groups. On the
other hand, the specific character and content of the marital abode
(e.g., the nature of the family, what are its objects and the roles of
each part of it), as well as the very meaning of this institution (e.g., is
it merely a social institution, or does it have religious dimensions;
what are its main goals), is different from one cultural, social, reli-
gious, etc. group to another. Each group has its own understanding
of the substantive meaning of the family and the rights and values at-
tached to it.
The distinction between social practices and substance makes it
possible for contradictory worldviews to coexist. It demands mutual
recognition of shared practices, but it does not require any part of the
society to change its own values and beliefs. It goes without saying
that recognizing the social fact of different lifestyles is not an easy
task, but it is possible. It has some price, but does not demand waiv-
ing one's entire ideology. Values, in other words, can still coexist
with practical tolerance of the other."
This is exactly the point where the law plays a role. As it seems,
the great controversies on the legal status of same-sex couples mirror
flourish-despite the divisions arising out of our deeply held beliefs." JOHN D. INAZU, Confi-
dent Pluralism: Surviving and Thriving Through Deep Difference (Introduction) WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY IN ST. Louis LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER No. 15-05-02 (2015), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2612122.
52. 1 have used the term tolerance here (rather than pluralism) in order to emphasize
that this framework does not demand a substantial acceptance of the other's values, but rather a
practice of recognition. However, it may also be defined as weak pluralism.
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the substantial conflicts of which homosexuality is a part. By putting
law in its proper place, that is, reflecting social standards rather than
absolute truth, we can reduce the level of tension in society. The le-
gal status of same-sex relationships will therefore reflect the fact that
for a significant group of society, it is a legitimate way of expressing
their common social practices.
How can this be effected? In my opinion, it is first and foremost a
question of consciousness: is it possible to acknowledge that legal
rights for various lifestyles merely reflect the realistic recognition of a
diverse society, without contradicting one's own values and beliefs?
As I have argued above, in order to reconcile between disputing parts
of the divided society, the answer has to be yes.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Bridging the gaps between the various groups in a divided society
is possible even in the present context, in which the very concept of
marriage is seen so differently by diverse groups of society. It requires
a kind of duality (a duality of social practices and communal be-
liefs)-bridging the gap while recognizing shared social standards,
but without imposing the acceptance of substantial understanding of
the rights and values of one group on another.
It is not the object of this paper to analyze or criticize the Oberge-
fell case. Yet, one comment should be made. If we want to achieve a
practical agreement on social practices, as I have proposed above, the
appropriate way is through democratic legislation, as Chief Justice
Roberts's dissenting opinion argues, rather than through the courts."
A decision made and enforced by the court sends a message of a sub-
stantial truth, with no recognition or legitimacy granted to different
worldviews. Legislation could attain the same legal result (that is,
equal rights for same-sex couples), but without the somehow prob-
lematic message. Following Hart's concept of law, this legislation
should be treated as practical respect for the plurality of the society,
while enabling each element of the society to preserve its own values
of family and family life.
My final remark is directed to the traditional, or conservative,
groups. An old Jewish Midrash14 tells us that when God wanted to
53. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2525-26 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
54. Gen. Rabbah 8:5.
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create Adam, Truth (among others) came and tried to convince Him
not to do so, arguing that humans are "all lies." As a response, God
threw Truth to the ground, but then raised it up from the earth, as
the Biblical verse says: "Truth springs up from the earth" (Psalm
85:12). Truth, according to the midrash, therefore, had to become
part of real life against its will.
It might be true from a religious perspective that same-sex mar-
riage is wrong. This is a traditional or religious view that should be
heard as well, but same-sex partnership has become part of the reali-
ty, and the more traditional views, too, have to recognize this fact.
Truth then, taking the midrashic terminology, needs to rise up from
the ground. It may argue for different values, trying to convince oth-
ers to follow it, but it must accept, or at least tolerate, those who live
differently. My proposed dual structure enables this social practice to
acknowledge different types of alliances (including marriage), even if
they are debatable, while each group's beliefs can be left unscathed.
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